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Effectiveness of COOL in the U.S. Seafood Industry 
“Unscrupulous importers and some foreign producers are now 'gaming the system' to move 
seafood products into the commercial food industry that might not withstand 'grocery store 
scrutiny' where nearly all items are now labeled for country of origin”. The Catfish Institute  
Introduction 
The spate of incidents in the last couple of months regarding imports has turned the heat 
back on the issue of mandatory country-of-origin labeling (MCOOL). Prominent among 
the incidents are recalls of a number of Chinese-made products: farm-raised shrimp and 
catfish, pet food laced with contaminated wheat gluten, toothpaste containing diethylene 
glycol-  a  poison  used  in  antifreeze,  children's  necklaces  and  earrings,  toy  trains  and 
popular preschool toys containing high levels of lead. These presumptions are supported 
by Barboza (2007), who outlines the degrading conditions in which seafood for export to 
United States is farmed in China. The media also reports that at-risk Chinese seafood 
shipments  that  are  supposed  to  be  tested  for  safety  are  going  unchecked  and  FDA 
personnel  “inspect  less  than  1  percent  of  all  imported  food  and  conduct  laboratory 
analysis on only a tiny fraction of those” (LA times, 2007).  At the same time, a food 
labeling poll conducted by Consumer Reports shows that consumers want to know where 
their  food  comes  from  and  expect  higher  label  standards.  According  to  the  poll,  92 
percent of consumers agree that imported foods should be labeled by their country of 
origin.  
COOL was introduced in April 2005 and implemented in September 2006 on fish 
and shellfish by the U.S. Congress. The objective was to communicate to consumers the 
national  origin  and  method(s)  of  production  (wild  and/or  farm-raised)  via  mandatory 
labels. The labels are however restricted to fresh and frozen seafood at the retail level.   3 
Foodservice establishments, small retailers and ingredients in processed seafood products 
are exempt. The resulting partial coverage creates a gaping hole possibly undermining the 
effectiveness of COOL law.  
Organizations  like  The  Catfish  Institute  (TCI)  of  the  United  States  are 
spearheading a drive to require that country of origin labels for imported seafood be 
displayed on restaurant menus. TCI believes that consumers should be informed of the 
origin of catfish served in restaurants as a result of recent media reports that revealed 
imported catfish contained harmful pollutants such as malachite green, illegal antibiotics 
and salmonella bacteria.  
There are a number of seafood guides available on the Internet, magazines, and 
newspapers which help consumers make proper and informed choices. Table 1 describes 
a healthy seafood  guide for consumers and provides information about seafood, their 
origin,  and  method  of  production.  Considering  that  most  of  the  fish  in  the  “avoid” 
category pertain to imported fish, it becomes imperative for foodservice establishments to 
disclose origin information. Restaurant materials that can be distributed to foodservice 
operators to convey origin include brochures on food safety, logo stickers for menus and 
certificates that can be framed and hung.  
The growth of cheaper imports of seafood, increase in consumption away-from-
home, and partial implementation of COOL imply that a large part of the market is not 
covered by the law. Over the past five years there has been an increase in demand for fish 
and seafood products, primarily due to the steady  growth in eating away-from-home. 
According to Hale (2005), restaurants are the key source of seafood, with 60 percent of 
consumers reporting they eat more seafood away from home. The trend in per capita   4 
away-from-home and at-home food expenditures is shown in figure 1. Away-from-home 
food expenditure increased from 44.9 percent of total food expenditures in 1991 to 47 
percent  in  1999,  and  48.9  percent  in  2006  (figure  2).  Reasons  for  this  trend  include 
smaller  household  size,  more  affordable  and  convenient  fast  foodservices,  a  growing 
number of women working outside the home, and higher household incomes (USDA-
ERS, 1999). While no study specifically focuses on consumption of seafood away from 
home, some have found that significant amount of seafood is consumed in restaurants. 
An estimate by Keithly (1985) suggested that the quantity of away-from-home seafood 
products consumed ranged from one-third to two-thirds of all consumption of seafood. A 
study by Selassie, House, and Sureshwaran (2002) found 57, 62, and 58 percent of meals 
of shrimp, oysters, and catfish, respectively, were consumed away-from-home. Stewart et 
al.  (2004)  predict  that  per  capita  spending  could  rise  by  18  percent  at  full-service 
restaurants and by 6 percent for fast food between 2000 and 2020. 
Currently,  over  70  percent  of  the  seafood  Americans  consume  is  imported 
(National Marine Fisheries Service, 2007). Despite relatively stable domestic demand, 
seafood imports are expected to increase at an average annualized rate of 2.4 percent, 
over the five years to December 2007 (Ibisworld, 2007). In the United States, imports 
represent a large share of domestic demand because most of the locally caught species 
receive a better price in key overseas markets than they do at home (Ibisworld, 2007). 
According  to  Ibisworld  (2007)  the  mass  U.S.  market  buys  large  quantities  of  less 
expensive fish species from Thailand, China, Vietnam, India and other sources, which are 
not available from local catches. Figures 3 and 4 show the upward trend in imports and   5 
overall per capita seafood consumption in the United States. The difference between the 
total and fresh & frozen seafood is processed seafood (canned and cured). 
The  significant  share  of  imports  in  U.S.  seafood  consumption  raises  concern 
about their safety. Imports are not necessarily subjected to the same standards of quality 
and safety control as that of domestic seafood. In the United States, the use of Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) system is considered a means to achieve that 
end.  HACCP  operates  in  the  context  of  an  extensive  set  of  requirements  for  good 
manufacturing  practices  and  sanitary  operating  procedures.  In  addition,  there  are 
numerous federal and state regulations that influence the location and timing of harvest 
and the choices of aquaculture operations (Caswell, 2006). Products from less developed 
countries  are  generally  perceived  to  be  of  lower  quality  than  products  of  developed 
countries (Verlegh and Steenkamp, 1999). Although there is no evidence that imported 
seafood is necessarily riskier, a number of countries exporting seafood to the United 
States have poorer internal control systems and/or are in tropical areas where toxin and 
bacteria hazards are higher. Imports become an issue of concern because countries vary 
in  their  use  of  vaccines,  feed  additives,  and  antibiotics  for  farm  raised  and  shellfish 
(Allshouse et al., 2004). Eighty percent of the total imported edible seafood in 2007 came 
from less developed countries (U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau). 
The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  examine  the  welfare  effects  of  COOL 
implementation on seafood for consumers; as more than 70 percent of seafood consumed 
in the United States is imported and most of it (by value) is consumed in the foodservice 
sector. Given that COOL is a retail labeling program and does not cover the foodservice 
sector, most of the imported seafood consumed in United States is not affected by the   6 
COOL  legislation.  Moreover,  an  ERS  study  reports  that  away-from-home  seafood 
volume will increase by 30 percent by 2020. The presence of a non-labeled sector raises 
the  possibility  of  diversion  of  lower  quality  seafood  into  this  sector,  which  would 
undermine the effectiveness of the law.  
To address the economic impact of the COOL law in the foodservice and retail 
sector,  this  paper  develops  a  conceptual  model  that  demonstrates  the  incentive  for 
diversion of imported seafood to the non-labeled sector. The model is a variant of the 
model of vertical product differentiation by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and it explicitly 
accounts  for  differences  in  consumer  attitudes  towards  foreign  and  domestic  seafood 
which are facilitated by origin labeling. Consumers are postulated to differ in the utility 
they  derive  from  the  consumption  of  domestic  and  foreign  seafood.  We  assume 
consumers  consider  foreign  fish  to  be  of  lower  quality  compared  to  domestic  fish.
1 
Wimberley et al. (2003) found that 80% of U.S. consumers believed that food produced 
or raised in the United States is fresher and safer than imported food. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a review 
of the relevant literature and gives some background information about the COOL law 
and its application in seafood. A theoretical model is then introduced to examine the 
economic impacts of COOL implementation. Following a numerical simulation analysis, 
the results are discussed, and concluding remarks are provided.  
 
                                                 
1 The assumption that consumers of domestic fish perceive it to be of higher quality than imported fish is 
reinforced by a) the recent safety incidents with imported products, b) media reports on fish farming 
practices of developing countries and the ineffective inspection of imports, and c) presentation in popular 
magazine and newspaper article of the healthy seafood guide (table 1), which informs consumers to avoid 
most imported fish.  However, it is not always the case that imported seafood is of lower perceived quality 
than domestic seafood. For example, Mexican shrimp is considered to have superior flavor and texture over 
domestic or other imported shrimp. 
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Background and Related Literature 
The  Farm  Security  and  Rural  Investment  Act  of  2002  (the  Farm  Bill)  contained  a 
provision that required the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), to issue 
country of origin labeling guidelines for voluntary use by retailers who wished to notify 
their  customers  of  the  country  of  origin  and  method(s)  of  production  for  covered 
commodities.
2 The Farm Bill also required that a mandatory country of origin labeling 
program be in place by September 30, 2004. However with the exception of seafood, 
which was implemented April 04, 2005, the labeling of the rest of the commodities has 
been deferred to 2008. The law requires that any person who prepares, stores, handles, or 
distributes  a  covered  commodity  for  retail  sale  should  maintain  a  verifiable 
recordkeeping audit trail and suppliers to retailers are required to provide information 
indicating the country of origin and method of production of the covered commodity. To 
convey country of origin information to consumers, the law states that retailers may use a 
label, stamp, mark, placard, or other clear and visible sign on the covered commodity, or 
on the package, display, holding unit, or bin containing the commodity at the final point 
of consumption.
3 
The COOL legislation has accounted for a number of exemptions and exclusions; 
the foodservice sector is exempted.
4,
5  In addition, butcher shops, fish markets, exporters 
                                                 
2 Covered commodities is defined in the law as muscle cuts of beef (including veal), lamb, and pork; 
ground beef, ground lamb, and ground pork; farm-raised fish and shellfish; wild fish and shellfish; 
perishable agricultural commodities (fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables); and peanuts. 
 
3 For complete information on guidelines, definitions and implications of COOL, see USDA-AMS (2002), 
Vol. 67, No. 198. 
 
4 Exemption refers to establishments not required by the law to notify consumers of origin labeling while 
exclusion refers to covered commodities not required to inform consumers of its origin. 
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and small grocery stores of annual sales less than $230,000 are also exempt. Excluded 
commodities  include  all  processed  foods  (cooked,  steamed,  cured,  smoked  and 
restructured), ingredient in a processed food item, cooked and canned fish.
6 Examples of 
seafood excluded are salmon in sushi, scallops and shrimp in a seafood medley, shrimp 
cocktail,  crab  salad,  clam  chowder,  breaded  shrimp,  soups,  marinated  fillets  (as  an 
ingredient in another product); fish sticks, surimi (processed); and canned items like tuna, 
salmon  and  sardines.  Essentially  then,  the  labeling  requirement  applies  to  fresh  and 
frozen  seafood  whether  whole,  cut  into  steaks  or  fillets,  or  broken  into  pieces  at  the 
retailer’s level (USDA-AMS, 2004). Figure 5 highlights the classification of the seafood 
market under COOL implementation according to products excluded and sector exempt.  
USDA-AMS (2004) reports the effect of COOL on retailers and the quantity of 
fish and shellfish consumed in the retail sector. They find that 93.3 percent of all food 
store  retailers  are  not  subject  to  the  requirements  of  mandatory COOL.  USDA-AMS 
(2004) estimate that COOL will have an annual effect on 41.4 percent of fish and seafood 
products  moving  through  retail.  This  percentage is  obtained  by  multiplying  the  retail 
quantity share of total food consumption (62.9 percent) by share of sales of fish and 
seafood products by retailers affected by COOL (65.8 percent). Overall exempt market 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Foodservice establishments include restaurants, cafeterias, lunchrooms, food stands, saloons, tavern, bars, 
lounges, or other similar facility operated as an enterprise engaged in the business of selling food to the 
public. Retailer is defined as a person who is a dealer engaged in the business of selling any perishable 
agricultural commodity and fish solely at retail with an invoice value in any calendar year of more than 
$230,000. Retail outlets for food consumed at home include food stores, warehouse clubs, and superstores 
(USDA-AMS, 2002). 
 
6 A processed food item is a retail item derived from fish or shellfish that has undergone specific processing 
resulting in a change in the character of the covered commodity, or that has been combined with at least 
one other covered commodity or other substantive food components (e.g., breading, tomato sauce); except 
that the addition of a component (such as water, salt or sugar) that enhances or represents a further step in 
the preparation of the product for consumption, would not in itself result in a processed food item (USDA-
AMS, 2004). 
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(retailers not subject to the rule and foodservice establishments) account for 62 percent of 
fish and 75 percent of shellfish.  
Effectively COOL is a retail labeling program, which brings us to the question of 
mandatory  labeling  in  the  foodservice  sector.  The  absence  of  labeling  results  in  an 
information  problem  between  buyers  and  sellers.  More  specifically,  buyers  are  not 
informed of the origin of seafood that sellers know about.
7 This information deficit may 
lead consumers to make choices they would not have made with full information. We 
assume as in Lusk et al. (2006), consumers value origin information through labeling 
because  they  associate  quality  of  seafood  with  its  origin.  Like  nutritional  attributes, 
quality is referred to as credence attribute. A credence attribute implies consumers cannot 
learn  about  characteristics  of  a  product  readily  through  inspection  or  even  after 
consumption (Nelson 1970; Darby and Karni 1973). However, a credence attribute can be 
transformed  to  a  search  attribute  as  COOL  is  associated  with  information  about  the 
seafood products that may affect the consumers’ perception and evaluation of its quality.
8 
Thus, the foodservice sector can be described as a market characterized by imperfect and 
asymmetric  information  (Variyam,  2005).
9  In  markets  where  sellers  have  information 
about product quality (or origin in our case) that cannot be credibly conveyed to the 
                                                 
7 It is reasonable to expect seller’s (in this case foodservice operators) awareness of the origin of fish and 
shellfish. They are better informed about the ingredients used in prepared meals, proportions in which they 
are mixed, and the cooking methods used. 
 
8 Search attributes are defined as attributes that can be evaluated prior to purchase (Nelson 1970; Darby and 
Karni 1973). We assume origin is synonymous with information about quality, hence COOL transforms 
credence good to search. Lusk et al. (2006) state that country of origin is often associated with product 
quality. 
 
9 Imperfect information implies consumers do not know the quality of seafood consumed in the absence of 
labeling, while asymmetric information implies seller knows relevant information about a product (origin) 
that the buyer does not know. 
   10 
buyers (that is buyers have no way of knowing if the information is accurate or truthful), 
only poor-quality products will be sold (Akerlof, 1970). In such markets, MCOOL may 
increase social welfare by enabling sellers to credibly convey information and by aiding 
buyers to choose products that better match their preferences. Antle (1996) and Caswell 
and  Mojduszka  (1996)  observe  markets  characterized  by  imperfect  and  asymmetric 
information that can be made to function efficiently through policy options available such 
as  development  of  private  product  reputations  through  advertising,  product  quality 
certification and labeling, liability laws, or statutory regulation of either the process or 
performance standard variety. 
The  literature  on  COOL  covers  both  benefits  and  costs  associated  with  the 
regulation. Agricultural economists have focused on consumers willingness-to-pay for 
meat  products  of  U.S.  origin  (Schupp  and  Gillespie,  2001;  Umberger  et  al.,  2003; 
Wimberley  et  al.,  2003;  Loureiro  and  Umberger,  2003,  2005;  Mabiso  et  al.,  2005; 
Caswell and Joseph, 2007), quantifying the costs and benefits of COOL ( Golan, Kuchler, 
and Mitchell, 2000; Food Marketing Institute, 2002; Sparks Companies Inc., 2003; Davis, 
2003;  Hayes  and  Meyer,  2003;  Lusk  and  Anderson,  2004;  USDA-AMS,  2004),  on 
assessing welfare effects of the policy (Plain and Grimes, 2003; Grier and Kohl, 2003; 
Krissoff  et  al.,  2004;  Brester,  Marsh,  and  Atwood,  2004;  Lusk  and  Anderson,  2004; 
Schmitz, Moss, and Schmitz, 2005), and on COOL being a form of branding or product 
differentiation strategy (Carter, Krissoff and Zwane, 2006). Lusk et al. (2006) argue that 
a  COOL  label,  rather  than  biasing  quality  perceptions,  might  actually  create  quality. 
However, a comprehensive study examining COOL (USDA-AMS, 2004) finds that the 
U.S. economy would be worse off after implementing COOL. Their conclusion is based   11 
on the assumption that COOL will not change consumers’ preference for covered fish 
and shellfish commodities. They find little evidence that consumers are willing to pay a 
price premium for COOL and increase their purchase of food items bearing the U.S. 
origin label as a result of this rule. However, this is a debated point in the literature.
10  
While no one has specifically studied the economic impacts of the non-uniformity 
of  the  COOL  law,  others  have  noted  that  loopholes  can  be  taken  advantage  of.  For 
example, in their study of the consequences of COOL in the pork industry, Iqbal, Kim, 
and Rude (2006) write “..if U.S. retailers chose not to incur the extra costs of stocking 
Canadian  pork,  there  are  alternative  outlets  for  Canadian  pork  including  processed 
products and the HRI trade” (p. 19). Similarly, USDA-AMS (2004) state “…majority of 
the sales of the covered commodity are through channels not affected by this rule, which 
provides substantial marketing opportunities for products without verifiable country of 
origin claims”. Another example is Tim Hammonds (2003), the president of the Food 
Marketing Institute (FMI), who says “…ranchers unable to document the history of their 
animals will find themselves unable to sell to supermarkets forcing their beef into the 
export or foodservice sectors, which are not covered under COOL regulation”.  
The potential diversion of lower quality seafood to non-labeled sectors can be 
inferred from the trade diversion literature. Trade diversion is defined as a shift in trade 
flows away from firms whose imports are affected by a trade barrier (named firms) to 
firms  that  import  the  same  product  but  are  not  affected  (non-named  firms).  Trade 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that apparently the USDA assumptions are primarily for general food commodities 
affected by COOL that have been extrapolated and applied to seafood. Such generalizations may not be 
accurate for seafood. Seafood is a commodity with distinct characteristics compared to meat and 
agricultural produce. For instance, significant quantity of seafood consumed in the United States is 
imported, and consumed away from home. 
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diversion has been covered extensively in the literature (Staiger and Wolak, 1994; Wylie, 
1995; Krupp and Pollard, 1996; Prusa, 1997; Vandenbussche, Konings, and Springael, 
1999; Pauwels, Vandenbussche, and Weverbergh, 2001; Brenton, 2001; Fukao, Okubo, 
and Stern, 2003; Baylis and Perloff, 2007). Reasons explaining trade diversion include 
anticipation  or  imposition  of  a  trade  barrier  (for  example,  antidumping  duties), 
investigation effect-when imposed or threatened to be imposed, or formation of trade 
blocs such as NAFTA. This paper deals with trade diversion between two sectors as 
opposed to countries, namely, retail and foodservice due to implementation of COOL in 
the retail sector. COOL can be considered analogous to a trade barrier. COOL in retail 
could result in an increase in the quantity of imports to the foodservice sector compared 
to the quantity of imports in the absence of COOL. This is because the regulation requires 
labels  on  seafood  sold  in  the  retail  sector  which  can  impose  costs  making  imports 
expensive  in  the  retail  sector.    These  costs  can  be  easily  circumvented  by  diverting 
imports to the foodservice sector. Additionally, the difference in the quality of domestic 
and foreign fish make the foodservice sector more attractive to foreign fish as consumers 
have no way of knowing the origin of seafood in the foodservice sector.  
The contributions of this paper is its distinct focus on the economic impacts of 
partial coverage of COOL in the seafood industry, accounting for imperfect competition 
among  retailers  and  foodservice  sectors,  and  modeling  consumer  heterogeneity 
characterized by different preferences for quality. A related work is USDA-AMS (2004) 
which is a comprehensive study of COOL on the seafood industry. Using a CGE model 
they determine costs incurred in the supply chain as a result of this regulation. They 
assume that retailers are perfectly competitive and COOL does not result in increased   13 
consumer  demand  for  domestic  products.  Plastina  and  Giannakas  (2007)  account  for 
imperfect competition among retailers for specialty crops, and consider consumer and 
producer heterogeneity in determining welfare effects of the supply chain participants 
when COOL is implemented.  
Theoretical model 
The model builds on Zago and Pick (2004) who analyze the welfare impact of labeling 
policies on agricultural commodities with credence attributes. Our analysis considers two 
scenarios, namely, market presence and absence of COOL. In the absence of COOL, 
origin of seafood cannot be distinguished by consumers; consequently, quality cannot be 
ascertained (product appears undifferentiated to consumers), resulting in imperfect and 
asymmetric information. While consumers are unable to differentiate domestic fish from 
foreign, we assume that sellers in retail and foodservice sectors can differentiate. In the 
presence  of  COOL,  however,  the  sectors  are  segmented  with  quality  differentiation 
generating a higher price for domestic fish than foreign fish.
11 Further, two scenarios are 
considered  in  the  presence  of  COOL  on  consumer  welfare:  Current  partial 
implementation  (retail  sector  labeled)  and  Total  implementation  (both  retail  and 
foodservice sectors labeled); with and without costs of implementation.
12 In this model, 
domestic  and  foreign  firms  supplying  seafood  are  considered  to  be  perfectly 
                                                 
11 Assuming that minimum average cost of production is greater for high quality than for low quality, it 
follows that market equilibrium prices  H p and L p satisfy the condition
L H p p > (Antle, 2001). 
 
12 Fish producers and harvesters will need to create and maintain records to establish origin and production 
Additional producer and harvester costs include the cost of establishing and maintaining a recordkeeping 
system for origin and production information, product identification, labor and training. Cost distribution 
will not be the same for all suppliers of covered commodities. It will depend on the availability of substitute 
products not covered by the rule and the relative competitiveness of the affected suppliers with respect to 
other sectors of the U.S. and world economies. Systems need to be implemented to ensure that origin and 
production information is transferred from producers to the next buyers of their products, and that the 
information is maintained for the required amount of time. 
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competitive.
13 Following previous literature, we examine the impact of market power in 
retail and foodservice sectors on the welfare effects of COOL.
14 The general notions of 
verification, monitoring, and consumer trust in the COOL labels are assumed. 
We consider a one-period game under vertical differentiation, with two qualities 
for a single good. The domestic country is the United States and the foreign country is the 
major exporter of seafood to United States. It is reasonable to assume the quality,k , of 
seafood is exogenous. Quality of seafood products is defined here to depend on location 
and conditions of catch or aquaculture, processing, and handling throughout the supply 
chain (Caswell, 2006). In keeping with the assumptions that domestic seafood industry is 
regulated by the government with stricter policies, and foreign seafood industry does not 
have  to  follow  comparable  restrictive  standards, domestic  firm  produces  high  quality 
seafood and the foreign firm produces products that are assumed to be of lower quality, 
or at least perceived as such. Thus, quality can be either low ( L k ) or high ( H k ). Domestic 
and foreign firms produce seafood with different production technologies and costs of 
production.  Parameters  L c and  H c reflect  production  costs  for  the  two  qualities  such 
that H L c c < . That is, foreign fish can be produced (and sold, since supply is competitive) 
at a lower price than domestic fish. 
 
 
                                                 
13 The seafood supply chain is characterized by fish farmers (harvesters/producers), intermediaries 
(processors, importers, wholesalers and handlers) and retailers/foodservice establishments. For simplicity 
we consider two levels: firms and establishments; where firms include fish farmers and intermediaries, and 
establishments are defined as retailers/foodservice establishments. Firms are further classified as foreign 
and domestic according to the origin of seafood supplied. 
 
14 Evidences of market power exercised by retailers over suppliers and consumers are highlighted in Sexton 
et al. (2003) and Richards and Patterson (2003).  
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Supply side 
Following Zago and Pick (2004) and Bureau, Marette, and Schiavina (1998), we assume 
each firm  j  (supplier of seafood to retail/foodservice), where 1 = j  to  n, maximizes a 
profit  ij π , and produces a quantity  + ℜ ∈ ij q  of the type  H L i , =  where  i represents 
quality. The aggregate supply  ) ( i i i w Q q = is the summation of individual supply  ij q for 
each qualityi.  i w  is the market price of selling seafood to retail/foodservice sector. The 
overall firms’ surplus  i Π  is the sum of individual profits  ij π . The analytical expressions 
of aggregate surplus for firms of quality i seafood and aggregate supply function are:
15 
(1)  ( ) , 5 . 0
2
ij i i ij ij q c w q − = π                    
(2)  i i i i c w w Q / ) ( =                
Demand side 
To analyze consumer welfare, consider a conceptual model of heterogeneous consumers. 
The model is a variant of the classic model of vertical product differentiation by Mussa 
and Rosen (1978) and it explicitly accounts for differences in consumer attitudes towards 
quality of fish. There is a continuum of consumers indexed by their preferenceθ  for fish 
quality, which is uniformly distributed over  [ ] θ , 0  with density θ / 1 .
16 The size of both 
sectors is normalized to one. We assume that each consumer buys at most one unit of the 
good with qualityk . The associated utility is: 
(3)  p k U − =θ                      
                                                 
15 The first order conditions imply  0 0 : 0 0
1 1























16 It should be noted that as the lower bound of the taste distribution is equal to zero, the market will not be 
entirely covered, i.e., some consumers prefer not to buy the good offered.   16 
where  p is the price of the good of quality  k and consumers’ willingness to pay for a 
quality  k , is given by  k θ . Aggregate demand depends on consumers’ belief about the 
quality i.e. consumers’ information about the origin of seafood available in the market. 
Without COOL, consumers believe they are consuming seafood of expected quality  k  
while with COOL, consumers relate origin information of seafood to their perceived 
quality, denoted by  H k and  L k .
17  
Before COOL: The Undifferentiated Market 
In the absence of COOL, origin and production method cannot be determined by the 
consumers.  That  is,  there  is  imperfect  information  in  the  market.  Further,  there  is 
asymmetric information as sellers are aware of the origin and production of fish while 
consumers  cannot  identify  them.  In  the  extreme  case,  if  a  consumer  has  imperfect 
information  about  the  quality  of  the  product,  sellers  will  resort  to  selling  the  lowest 
possible  quality  of  a  good.  Lusk  et  al.  (2006)  state  “…  consumers  will  make  an 
assumption about the average quality of the product on the market. Because the market 
will contain products from a variety of origins, the expected quality of the product on the 
market might fall well below the perceived quality of the domestic product”.  
We make the assumption that without COOL, sellers in retail and foodservice 
sector sell only foreign seafood because, in the context of this model, they do not have an 
                                                 
17 Weighted average quality would depend on consumers’ awareness of quality difference by origin and 
association of quality with practices of countries. We assume that with asymmetric information in the non-
labeled market, consumers evaluate seafood quality using a simple average: 
2
L H k k
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=    17 
incentive to sell domestic seafood.
18 Figure 6 shows schematically the seafood market in 
the absence of COOL.   
The retail and foodservice sectors are considered two separate markets. In both 
markets, consumers are heterogeneous in their preference for quality and are postulated 
to  differ  in  the  utility  or  marginal  willingness  to  pay  that  they  derive  from  the 
consumption of seafood. We assume that consumers have the same valuation for seafood 
in the two markets. A unique price  p  develops in both the sectors and consumers have 
an expected quality k  as mentioned above. 
The conditional indirect utility function of a consumer with preference parameter 






                                                                           nothing   consumes   if 0




 where  l=r   for  retail  and  f l =   for  foodservice.  The  consumer  indifferent  between 
buying seafood or not receives the same level of utility from consuming or not in the two 





' θ   
                                                 
18 The framework considered here implies that consumers do not know the actual quality of seafood 
supplied and would consume foreign seafood in the absence of labeling because there is also uncertainty 
about the extent to which it is potentially unsafe for their health. However, when information is available 
about the origin of seafood, some consumers are willing to pay more for domestic seafood. 
In the absence of information regarding the origin of seafood, domestic and foreign fish are marketed 
together and the price received by establishments is the same regardless of which product is produced 
(pooling equilibrium; see Akerlof 1970). The absence of a premium for domestic seafood when they are not 
segregated, coupled with increased costs of producing domestic seafood, result in the profitability of the 
domestic fish being lower than that of foreign fish. In this case the supply of domestic seafood is not 
incentive compatible; market forces lead to failure of the market to satisfy expressed consumer demands. 
Hence, only foreign seafood is sold. 
 
   18 
Consumers with valuation for quality greater than 
'
l θ  will buy seafood and the 
consumers with valuation for quality lower than 
'
l θ   will not buy seafood. Thus, the 
demand for seafood in a market with no differentiation can be found by aggregating the 
quantity consumed by consumers with  l θ  > 
'
l θ . With  1 = l θ , the demand at retail or 
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To determine equilibrium quantity and price before COOL implementation, we 
solve the profit maximization function for the retailer and foodservice. Then, derived 
demand at the retailer and foodservice level is equated with supply of foreign firms. The 
two sectors are each characterized by N identical retailers and N identical foodservice 
establishments competing with each other, and have market power over consumers. 
19  
The individual retailer/foodservice establishment  m   ) ,..., 1 ( N m = maximizes a profit 
given by: 
(7)  [ ] lm L l
BC
lm
q q w Q p
lm
− = ∏ ) ( max               
where  f r l , =  and  ) 1 ( ) ( l l Q k Q p − =  is the inverse demand for non-labeled seafood in 
retail  or  foodservice.  L w   represents  price  of  foreign  seafood  paid  by  retailers  and 
foodservice establishments to foreign firms.
20 The first order conditions of (7) imply:  
                                                 
19 Dimitri, Tegene, and Kaufman (2003) review studies on market power of retailer over both consumers 
and producers in the fresh produce market. Here we assume retailer/foodservice has market power only in 
selling, i.e. they behave as oligopolists. 
 
20 We assume the retail and foodservice sector incur the same costs of purchasing seafood and that is the 
only cost (for e.g., no transportation costs) for simplicity. 
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= Θ  represent conjectural variation elasticity on the demand faced by 
the retailer/foodservice establishment  m . It is defined as the percentage change of the 
aggregate quantities demanded caused by a percentage change in quantities sold by the 
establishment. Following Porter (1983) and Bresnahan (1989), aggregating over identical 
retail/foodservice  establishment  m ,  each  weighted  by  its  market  share  N / 1  









. Equation (8) can then be written as: 
(9)  ( ) ( ) L l w Q k = Θ + − 1 1   
   The parameter  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ Θ  where zero implies the establishments have no market 
power,  while  a  higher  value  represents  a  higher  degree  of  market  power  and  1 = Θ  
implies perfect collusion. 
Equating derived demand (9) facing the foreign firms aggregated over retail and 




















































The superscript notation  k refers to equilibrium in the absence of COOL, and 
subscript  l  as  mentioned  before  refers  to  retailer  or  foodservice  sector.  Using  (13), 
consumers’ surplus in the absence of COOL can be calculated by integrating consumer 
utility at equilibrium for consumers who consume a unit of seafood with preference  l θ : 
(14)  2
3 1
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Consumer welfare before implementing COOL can be considered as a benchmark 
when evaluating the effects of COOL implementation. Equation (14) is used to aggregate 
consumer surplus in the two sectors to get expected consumer welfare: 
(15)  2
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and it depends positively on the expected quality of seafood and negatively on the costs 
of producing low quality fish and oligopoly power of establishments. 
For  the  purpose  of  welfare  analysis  of  the  COOL  implementation,  we  also 
consider  real  consumer  surplus.  In  other  words,  consumers  in  reality  are  consuming 
seafood of quality  L k instead of expected quality  k . Thus, we compute real consumer 
surplus. The aggregate real consumer surplus for the same set of consumers and prices in 
equilibrium as before is illustrated in figure 7 and given as: 
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where  L H k k k − = ∆    21 
COOL in Retail: The partially differentiated market 
a. Zero costs of implementing COOL 
With COOL in the retail sector, consumers can distinguish between the domestic and 
foreign  seafood  indexed  by  quality  H k   and  L k   respectively.  As  mentioned  earlier, 
perceived quality L H k k > , and corresponding prices for seafood in retail are  H p and  L p , 
with  L H p p > . Again let us consider two firms; domestic and  foreign selling to two 
sectors: retail and foodservice. If consumers prefer domestic fish, the label would allow 
consumers to discriminate between foreign and domestic seafood. Suppose all domestic 
seafood (higher quality) is supplied to retail (because it is labeled) and foreign seafood 
(lower quality) is supplied to both the foodservice (non-labeled sector) and the retail 
sector, where it is labeled as such. By identifying seafood with their origin, retailers can 
convey implicit product quality information to consumers and a separating equilibrium 
that efficiently sort consumers into markets for different qualities (in our case origin) 
with corresponding prices may be attained. However, in the foodservice sector, in the 
absence of labeling, only foreign seafood is demanded (see footnote 18). Thus, COOL 
facilitates quality differentiation in retail and consumers have a choice between them as 
illustrated in figure 6. 
As in the previous model, there is a continuum of consumers with preference θ  
for quality, and with total mass of one distributed uniformly between zero and one, i.e., 
[ ] 1 , 0 ∈ θ . In this case, consumers in retail can differentiate seafood by means of perceived 
quality, while in foodservice, seafood are characterized by expected quality. With COOL 
facilitating the differentiation in terms of the origin of seafood in retail sector, the indirect 
utility of a consumer in the two sectors is given by:     22 
(17)   
                                                                          nothing   consumes   if
sector     (retail)   labeled in    seafood foreign    of unit    a   consumes   if
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     where H L k k k ≤ ≤ .  There  are  two  indifferent  consumers  in  the  retail  sector:  one 
between  consuming  domestic  seafood  and  foreign  seafood( ) HL θ ,  and  one  between 
consuming foreign seafood and not consuming at all( ) 0 L θ . Thus, retail consumers with 
valuation  [ ) 0 , 0 L θ θ ∈   will  not  consume  seafood,  while  those  with  [ ] HL L θ θ θ , 0 ∈   will 
consume the low-quality seafood and the others  ( ] 1 , HL θ θ ∈  will consume the high-quality 
seafood.  Similarly,  in  the  foodservice  sector,  consumers  are  indifferent  between 
consuming foreign seafood and not consuming at all ( f θ ). Accordingly, the indifferent 
consumers (using 17 and 18) and demand for each quality of seafood can be found by 
aggregating the quantity consumed of each type in the two sectors and are given by:  
Retail: 
(19)       
   
 
Foodservice: 
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To determine equilibrium quantity  and price, profit maximization function for 
individual retailer and foodservice is solved first: 
Each retailer m maximizes a profit given by: 
(21)  [ ] [ ] Lm L L H L Hm H L H H
AC
r q q q w Q Q p q w Q Q p
Lm Hm
− + − = ∏ ) , ( ) , ( max
,     
where  L L H H H L H H Q k Q k k Q Q p − − = ) , (   and  ( ) L H L L H L Q Q k Q Q p − − = 1 ) , (   are  the 
inverse demand for domestic and foreign seafood in retail.  H w  and  L w  represent price 
paid  by  retailer  for  domestic  and  foreign  seafood.  The  first  order  conditions  of  (21) 
imply: 
(22) 
L H L L L L
H L L H H H
w Q k Q k k






Each foodservice establishment m maximizes a profit given by: 
(23)  [ ] fm L f
AC
f q q w Q p
fm
− = ∏ ) ( max  
where  ) 1 ( ) ( f f Q k Q p − =  is the inverse demand for seafood in foodservice sector. The 
first order conditions of (23) imply: 
(24)  L f w Q k = − ) 1 ( λ  
Following COOL, two markets emerge: one for the high-quality seafood, and the 



















  Equating aggregate derived demand of retail and foodservice sectors (22 and 24) 






























For equilibrium quantities and prices in the two sectors and prices of domestic 
and foreign firms (27) see appendix I. Consumers’ surplus in retail and foodservice sector 
for this scenario is given as: 
(28) 
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The  expected  consumer  welfare  after  implementing  COOL  is  obtained  by 
aggregating consumer surplus in retail and foodservice sector (28). Refer to appendix I 
for the expression. 
Similar to our previous argument, consumer surplus in retail is real as there is no 
mismatch between real quality supplied and perceived quality. But the real consumer 
surplus in the foodservice sector (non-labeled)  is different and defined similar to the 
before COOL market.  The expressions for real consumer surplus in the foodservice 
sector and the aggregate real consumer surplus can be found in appendix I. 
b. With costs of implementation 
Let  us  now  assume  there  are  costs  related  to  COOL  implementation.  The  costs  are 
considered  at  two  levels:  Cost  of  labeling/recordkeeping  borne  by  retailers  b  and 
operating costs (segregation and identity preservation costs) y. Domestic firms bear the 
latter  costs  whereas  foreign  firms  do  not.  The  reason  being  that  imports  inform  the 
“ultimate purchaser” of their country of origin with labels; it is not contingent on COOL   25 
implementation.
21  The  profit  maximization  equations  and  equilibrium  quantities  and 
prices are as follows: 
Each retailer m maximizes a profit given by: 
(32)  [ ] [ ] Lm L L H L Hm H L H H
AC
r q q q b w Q Q p q b w Q Q p
Lm Hm
− − + − − = ∏ ) , ( ) , ( max
,           
Each foodservice establishment m maximizes a profit given by: 
(33)  [ ] fm L f
AC
f q q w Q p
fm
− = ∏ ) ( max  
Following  COOL,  domestic  firms  supplying  high-quality  seafood  incur  an 
additional cost y while the foreign firms’ supply function of low-quality seafood remains 
unchanged. Supply in the two markets can be written as:  
(34) 
L L L L
H H H H
c w w Q
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Equating aggregate demand facing the domestic and foreign firms with supply 
(34), and expected consumer welfare is the following: 
(35) 
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The expressions for expected consumer welfare after implementing COOL with 
costs, the real consumer surplus and equilibrium prices and quantities can be found in 
appendix I.   
                                                 
21 Ultimate purchaser has been defined as the last U.S. person who will receive the product in the form in 
which it was imported.   26 
COOL in Retail and Foodservice: The totally differentiated market 
a. Zero costs of implementing COOL 
Now, consider the case where COOL is implemented in both the retail and foodservice 
sectors. There is no informational asymmetry with consumers able to determine origin 
and make informed choices. An important outcome of uniform regulation in both sectors 
is  that  there  is  no  scope  for  diversion.  Figure  6  represents  the  scenario  of  a  totally 
differentiated  market.  Assuming  zero  implementation  costs  of  labeling,  the  profit-
maximization equation for individual retailer/foodservice establishment m becomes: 
(39)  [ ] [ ] Llm L Ll Hl L Hlm H Ll Hl H
AC
lm q q q w Q Q p q w Q Q p
Llm Hlm
− + − = ∏ ) , ( ) , ( max
,               
where  Ll L Hl H H Ll Hl H Q k Q k k Q Q p − − = ) , (   and  Ll L Hl L L Ll Hl L Q k Q k k Q Q p − − = ) , (   are  the 
inverse  demand  for  domestic  and  foreign  seafood  in  retail  or  foodservice.  All  other 
variables are as previously defined. The first order conditions of (39) imply: 
(40) 
L Hl L Ll L L
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Equating aggregate derived demands of retail and foodservice sectors (40) with 
supply of the domestic and foreign firms (25) indicate the following: 
(41) 
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Refer  to  appendix  I  for  equilibrium  prices  and  quantities,  and  total  consumer 
welfare. Consumer surplus at retail or foodservice sector when both are labeled is given 
by:   27 


















The  consumer  surplus  in  a  totally  differentiated  market  is  the  real  consumer 
surplus  unlike 
AC CS   (29  and  37)  and 
BC CS (15)  in  partially  differentiated  and 
undifferentiated markets respectively.  
b. With costs of implementation 
Here,  labeling  cost  b  is  applicable  to  foodservice  establishments  as  well,  i.e.,  both 
retailers and foodservice sectors bear this cost. As before, cost y is borne only by the 
domestic  firms.  The  profit-maximization  equation  for  individual  retailer/foodservice 
establishment m becomes: 
(45)  [ ] [ ] Llm L Ll Hl L Hlm H Ll Hl H
AC
lm
q q q b w Q Q p q b w Q Q p
Llm Hlm
− − + − − = ∏ ) , ( ) , ( max
,           
The first order conditions of (44) imply: 
(46) 
b p Q k Q k k
b p Q k Q k k
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Equating aggregate derived demand facing the domestic and foreign firms (46) 
with supply (34) indicate the following: 
(47) 
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Total consumer surplus, equilibrium prices and quantities can be found in appendix I.   
Analysis 
The COOL law aims to improve consumer welfare. Considering the pre-COOL scenario 
as  the  benchmark,  we  try  to  determine  the  effect  of  COOL  (partial  and  total   28 
implementation) on consumer welfare. As mentioned previously, we also consider market 
power at the retailer and foodservice level and implementation costs in consumer welfare 
comparisons. Following the definition of trade diversion which is referred to as a shift in 
trade flows away from firms whose imports are affected by a trade barrier (named firms) 
to firms that import the same product but are not affected (non-named firms), we consider 
diversion as a percentage of the relative share of foreign seafood increase in foodservice 
sector with partial implementation of COOL. Finally, we also examine producer welfare 
(profits) at the retail and foodservice level with COOL. 
Using Mathematica 5.1 we first calibrate the model to have a proper functioning 
market.
22 We normalize  1 , = L L k c  and determine values for  H H k c ,  in the feasible region 
of the functioning market. Within the feasible region, to analyze the effect of change in 
marginal production costs on consumer welfare and diversion, we fix  H k at 1.1 and vary 
H c from 200% to 300% of  L c . Similarly, to infer the effect of change in quality we fix  H c  
at 4 and vary  H k from 110% to 210% of  L k .
23 We allow  H H k c ,  to have differences in 
marginal costs and quality, respectively from 10% to 100%. Finally, we also vary market 
power parameter Θfrom 0% to 100%, fixing  H k at 1.1 and  H c  at 4.
24 
When we examine scenarios with positive implementation costs, we set  07 . 0 = b  
and  0025 . 0 = y . These are the first year implementation costs of COOL estimated per 
pound of seafood, for retailers and producers respectively (USDA-AMS, 2004).  
                                                 
22 A proper functioning market is defined as a market where all prices and quantities are positive. 
23 The values  4 , 1 . 1 = = H H c k  are both within the feasible region. 
24 We abbreviate pre-COOL market as BC, partial COOL implementation as PC, and total COOL 
implementation as TC in the numerical simulation figures.   29 
Figures  9  to  26  are  numerical  simulations  which  show  the  effects  of  varying 
marginal production costs, quality  and market power parameter on consumer welfare 
(Expected and Real), diversion percentage and profit at the retail and foodservice level. 
In the figures we abbreviate pre-COOL market as BC, partial COOL implementation as 
PC and total COOL implementation as TC. 
a.  Effect of varying  H c  on diversion percentages (figures 9 and 11) 
We  examine  diversion  by  comparing  the  quantity  of  low-quality  fish  sold  in  the 
foodservice sector under partial implementation of COOL to the quantity sold without 
COOL (see figure 8 for the formula used). Our initial hypothesis is that an unintended 
consequence  of  partial  COOL  is  the  diversion  of  low-quality  fish  to  the  non-labeled 
market. Figures 9 and 11 show that diversion increases with an increase in the production 
costs of high-quality fish under both perfect competition and market power, and also with 
and  without  considering  the  cost  of  implementing  COOL.  Pre-COOL  market  is 
characterized  by  foreign  seafood  supply  only  whereas,  with  partial  COOL,  domestic 
seafood is also supplied to the labeled sector. Increasing differences in the production 
costs make domestic fish more expensive relative to foreign fish. The difference in price 
makes foreign fish more attractive to consumers, therefore putting downward pressure on 
its price (compared to the pre-COOL scenario). This effect results in increased quantities 
of low-quality fish being supplied in the non-labeled sector. 
Diversion  is  greater  with  costs  of  COOL  implementation.  Labeling  costs  are 
borne by retailers on both domestic and foreign fish. Operating costs are imposed only on 
domestic firms. This results in domestic and foreign fish in retail sector becoming more 
expensive than foreign fish in foodservice sector. Foreign fish in the non-labeled market   30 
is cheaper due to price competition. Diversion occurs due to an increase in the quantity of 
foreign seafood sold in the non-labeled sector compared to the pre-COOL quantity in the 
foodservice sector. 
b.  Effect of varying  H k  on diversion percentages (figures 10 and 12) 
When the quality of domestic fish increases, diversion of foreign seafood into the non-
labeled market increases under both perfect competition and market power, and also with 
and without costs of implementing COOL (figures 10 and 12). The pre-COOL market is 
characterized by supply of low-quality foreign fish only, which consumers perceive to be 
of expected quality k . With partial COOL, high-quality domestic fish is also supplied to 
the  labeled  sector;  non-labeled  sector  behaves  similar  to  the  pre-COOL  market.  As 
quality increases, for pre-COOL scenario: k  which is a function of  H k  increases, price of 
fish increases, reducing quantity. Similarly for partial COOL scenario:  k  in foodservice 
sector and  H k  in retail sector increases, price of corresponding quality of fish increases, 
reducing  their  quantity  sold.  The  magnitude  of  price  increase  of  high-quality  fish  is 
greater than the price increase for expected quality fish.  Price competition in partial 
COOL between domestic and foreign seafood leads to price of expected quality fish in 
non-labeled sector being lower than price of expected quality fish in foodservice sector in 
the pre-COOL scenario. Thus, the quantity of low-quality fish sold in the non-labeled 
sector after COOL implementation would be greater than pre-COOL. As before diversion 
is greater with costs of COOL implementation.  
c.  Effects of varying  H c  on consumer surplus (figures 13, 14, 17 & 18)   31 
When the cost of producing and transforming domestic seafood ( H c ) increases relative to 
foreign  seafood  ( L c ),  consumer  surplus  decreases  in  all  scenarios  under  perfect 
competition and market power. Increasing differences in the production costs result in 
making domestic fish more expensive to consumers. The price to consumers of domestic 
fish increases which reduces consumer surplus; assuming all exogenous parameters are 
constant.  Pre-COOL  surplus  is  not  affected  as  we  consider  only  foreign  supply  of 
seafood. Thus, increase in  H c  results in diversion in partial COOL scenario, thereby 
reducing consumer surplus, and substitution of high-quality fish by low-quality fish in 
total COOL scenario. 
When  no  costs  of  implementation  are  considered,  we  anticipate  that  a  total 
implementation  of  COOL  will  result  in  greater  consumer  surplus  than  partial 
implementation. However, figures 13 and 17 show that expected consumer surplus is 
greatest with partial COOL. This result can be rationalized by realizing that expected 
welfare in the partial COOL scenario does not take into account the real quality  L k  of  
foreign  fish  supplied  to  consumers  in  the  non-labeled  sector,  rather  it  is  based  on 
consumers’ belief of quality k , wherek > L k . Thus, while consumers expect to be getting 
quality  k ,  they  are  in  fact  consuming  seafood  of  perceived  lower  quality.  Because 
consumer utility is dependent on the quality of the product consumed, consumer surplus 
is  necessarily  higher  when  consumers  believe  they  are  getting  k   rather  than  L k . 
Considering  that  consumers  are  truly  receiving  quality  L k ,  the  comparison  of  real 
consumer surplus (figures 14 and 18) under different scenarios of implementation reveals 
that it is greatest with total COOL.    32 
Considering the actual consumer welfare (real surpluses in figures 14 and 18), 
consumer welfare is greatest with total COOL followed by partial COOL and pre-COOL. 
Consumer surplus under total COOL is greatest because both sectors are labeled, which 
leads to expected quality being equal to real quality. In other words, consumers are aware 
of  the  quality  of  fish  they  consume  and  can  make  informed  choices.  Increase  in 
production  costs  result  in  making  domestic  fish  in  retail  and  foodservice  expensive, 
reducing quantity of domestic seafood demanded. Whereas, demand for foreign seafood 
increases as expensive domestic seafood is substituted by foreign seafood. Diversion of 
low-quality fish to the non-labeled sector, where it can masquerade as a higher quality, 
leads to decreasing consumer welfare under partial COOL. Thus, as substitution effect is 
less than diversion effect, consumer welfare in total COOL is greater than welfare in 
partial COOL.   Pre-COOL consumer surplus is the lowest because the market is non-
labeled and consumers are supplied only with low-quality foreign fish.  
When costs of implementation are considered for real consumer welfare (figures 
14 and 18), consumer surplus under partial COOL is greater than total COOL. Post-
COOL, domestic firms bear operating costs across partial and total COOL scenarios. 
However, the non-labeled sector in partial COOL does not bear the costs of labeling. This 
results  in  seafood  sold  in  the  labeled  sector  at  a  higher  price  than  without  costs  of 
implementation. Similarly, diversion in partial COOL scenario is greater than without 
costs of implementation. More costs are imposed on consumers of domestic and foreign 
seafood  under  total  COOL  compared  to  partial  COOL.  Cost  effect  in  total  COOL 
scenario  is  greater  than  diversion  effect  in  partial  COOL,  which  implies  consumer   33 
welfare under partial COOL is greater than total COOL when costs of implementation are 
considered.  
d.  Effect of varying  H k  on consumer surplus (figures 15, 16, 19 and 20) 
Expected  consumer  surplus  increases  in  all  scenarios  under  perfect  competition  and 
market power (figures 15 and 19). Real consumer surplus increases for total and partial 
COOL scenario, but decreases for pre-COOL (figures 16 and 20). The increases in high 
quality  H k , assuming all other exogenous parameters constant, can be interpreted as an 
increase  in  expected  consumer  welfare.  Real  consumer  surplus  is  lower  for  the  pre-
COOL market (relative to partial COOL) as consumers are being supplied only with low 
quality fish despite their belief of expected quality consumption of fish. However, as the 
quality of domestic fish increases, the expected quality increases, which increases the 
price and reduces the quantity of (foreign) fish consumed. Thus, real consumer surplus 
decreases before COOL is implemented. Under partial and total COOL implementation, 
real consumer surplus increases with differences in quality because some of the high-
quality fish is substituted for low-quality fish in the labeled market causing a positive 
impact on consumer surplus. 
  Real consumer surplus is greatest with total COOL (with and without costs of 
implementation) followed by partial COOL and pre-COOL as seen in figures 16 and 20. 
Following our previous discussion, consumer surplus under total COOL is greatest due to 
substitution of low-quality fish by high-quality fish in the labeled market. Partial COOL 
is characterized by two opposite effects on consumer welfare- substitution effect in retail 
(labeled sector) and expected quality effect in foodservice sector (non-labeled sector). 
The former results in positive consumer welfare, while the latter results in diversion,   34 
which decreases consumer surplus. With market power, consumer surplus decreases for 
partial COOL, as quantity of fish is restricted compared to without market power, and 
expected quality effect is greater than substitution effect. Absence of labeling in the pre-
COOL market results in consumer surplus being the lowest in this scenario as only low 
quality  foreign  seafood  is  supplied  despite  consumers’  belief  of  expected  quality. 
Expected  consumer  surplus  is  greatest  with  partial  COOL  due  to  the  mismatch  of 
expected and real quality as previously mentioned.  
e.  Effect of varying  H c  and  H k  on profits (figures 24 and 25) 
Increasing costs of production decreases profits of retail and foodservice sectors (figure 
24). Profits are greatest under partial COOL followed by total COOL and pre-COOL. 
Increasing  H c   results  in  diversion  in  partial  COOL  scenario,  therefore  profits  of 
foodservice sector is greater than retail sector, which in turn makes profits under partial 
COOL greater than total COOL. Absence of production costs associated with domestic 
seafood and implementation costs in the foodservice sector under partial COOL, cause 
foodservice sector profits to be the greatest. Pre-COOL profits show no change with 
increasing  H c  as only foreign seafood is supplied. 
  Effect of increasing quality on profits is seen in figure 25. Profits of retail and 
foodservice sectors increase with increasing quality. Profits are greatest for partial COOL 
followed  by  pre-COOL  and  total  COOL.  As  H k   increases  expected  quality  of  fish 
increases, but in reality low-quality fish is supplied. Consumers pay a higher price for 
low-quality seafood, which increases profits in the non-labeled market. Pre-COOL profits 
increase  at  a  greater  rate  than  partial  and  total  COOL  due  to  mismatch  of  quality 
perceived and quality supplied in the non-labeled market. Increase in quality also leads to   35 
diversion making profits in foodservice sector greater than profits in retail under partial 
COOL. Thus, aggregate profits are maximized in partial COOL scenario. 
f.  Effect  of  varying  Θon  consumer  surplus,  diversion  percentages,  and  profit 
(figures 21, 22, 23 and 26) 
Market  power  exerted  by  retail  and  foodservice  establishments  result  in  decreasing 
consumer welfare and diversion across all scenarios, and increasing profits. The decrease 
can  be  attributed  to  the  reduction  in  quantity  of  seafood  sold  in  both  retail  and 
foodservice sector, i.e., overall quantity is restricted when establishments exercise market 
power. The decrease in real consumer welfare from a perfectly competitive market to 
perfect collusion is approximately 50 percent across all scenarios, assuming quality and 
production  costs  are  fixed.  Similarly,  diversion  of  low-quality  seafood  into  the 
foodservice sector reduces from a perfectly competitive market to perfect collusion by 35 
to  50  percent.  Profits  increase  with  market  power  exerted  by  retail  and  foodservice 
sectors, as higher prices can be charged for seafood by establishments. 
Conclusions 
The seafood market in the United States is characterized increasingly by imported fish 
and shellfish from developing countries. The costs of production of domestic seafood are 
higher than those of the imported due to strict regulations and quality control processes in 
the United States. With the implementation of COOL in September 2006 in the seafood 
market, and the exemption of the foodservice sector from mandatory labeling, there is a 
potential for diversion of lower quality imports to the non-labeled sector. In other words, 
while labeling satisfies the market demand for information provision, exemptions of the 
law  creates  incentives  for  the  diversion  of  imports,  which  are  lower  in  quality  than   36 
domestic seafood, to the non-labeled sector. The diversion of lower quality seafood to the 
non-labeled  market  segment  has  consequences  on  the  welfare  impact  of  the 
implementation of COOL. 
This  paper  develops  a  conceptual  model  of  heterogeneous  consumers  that 
examines the consequences of COOL implementation on consumer welfare. Numerical 
simulation  results  show  that  consumer  welfare  decreases  with  increasing  costs  of 
production  as  fish  becomes  more  expensive.  Increasing  quality  differences  increase 
consumer welfare due to higher quality of seafood supplied. Diversion increases with 
increase in production costs and quality. In the pre-COOL scenario, only foreign seafood 
is assumed to be supplied, while after COOL implementation domestic seafood is also 
supplied. This difference in the nature of supply leads to foreign firms having a higher 
incentive to sell in the non-labeled sector with COOL implementation. Market forces 
create an incentive for foreign firms to masquerade lower quality fish as higher quality 
and to circumvent the additional costs associated with COOL implementation. 
 Consumer welfare is the greatest when COOL is implemented in both the retail 
and  foodservice  sectors  than  under  the  current  implementation  in  retail  only.  Total 
implementation helps consumers in making informed choices and reduces the potential 
diversion. Consumer welfare is the lowest in the pre-COOL scenario due to the mismatch 
of real and expected quality of fish. Consumers assume they are buying fish of a higher 
quality  than  it  is.  Market  power  exercised  at  the  retail  and  foodservice  sector  are 
detrimental  to  consumer  welfare  as  expected  while  it  decreases  diversion.  This  is 
attributed to the decrease in the overall quantity of seafood sold in the market. Thus, our 
study shows that labeling can mitigate asymmetric information problems arising from the   37 
credence nature of seafood products, correct supply-side market failures, and enhance 
consumer welfare.  
Our work has relevant policy implications. The effectiveness of implementing 
COOL  in  the  seafood  industry  needs  to  be  reconsidered  due  to  its  unintended 
consequences of diverting imported seafood towards the non-labeled market. The current 
state of the food industry, with numerous recent safety scares and popularization of safe 
seafood choices, has contributed to the perception that foreign fish is of lower quality 
than domestic fish. The nature of the industry characterized by a majority of imported 
seafood consumed away from home poses a real question on the credibility of retail-
COOL as a consumer-welfare-increasing policy. Though some labeling is perhaps better 
than none at all, partial labeling can lead to undermining the true effectiveness of the 
regulation. Further work will involve empirical work on popular seafood, like shrimp, to 
determine the effect of COOL on consumer welfare pre- and post-COOL implementation.  
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Table 1: Healthy seafood guide 
 
Twice a week  Once a week  Once a month  Avoid 






Clams; wild  Chilean sea bass* 
Catfish; U.S.  Tuna- Albacore*; 
U.S. or Canada 
Cod; Pacific  Cod; Atlantic 
Caviar; U.S. 
farmed 
















  Lobster; American 
or Maine 
Grouper* 
Crawfish; U.S.    Mahimahi  Haddock 
















Sardines    Shrimp; U.S. or 
Canada wild 
Rockfish; Pacific 




  Swordfish; U.S.*  Shark* 
Striped bass; 
farmed 




Sturgeon; farmed    Tuna- Albacore, 
light, yellowfin; 
Imported or U.S.* 
Skate 
Tilapia; U.S.      Snapper, red 
Trout, rainbow; 
farmed 
    Swordfish; 
Imported* 





on their mercury 




Some tips to ease 
decision making: 
In general opt for 










*fish is high in 
mercury or other 
contaminants. 
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Figure 6: Market scenarios for COOL   49 
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b. Post-COOL implementation 
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Figure 8: Diversion    51 
 
Figure 9: Diversion percentage ( 0 = Θ ,  1 . 1 = H k  ) 
 
 













Figure 10: Diversion percentage ( 0 = Θ ,  4 = H c  )  
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Figure 11: Diversion percentage ( 5 . 0 = Θ ,  1 . 1 = H k  ) 
 
 















Figure 12: Diversion percentage ( 5 . 0 = Θ ,  4 = H c  ) 
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Figure 13:  Expected consumer surplus ( 0 = Θ ,  1 . 1 = H k  ) 
 















Figure 14: Real consumer surplus ( 0 = Θ ,  1 . 1 = H k  ) 
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Figure 15: Expected consumer surplus ( 0 = Θ ,  4 = H c  ) 
 
















Figure 16: Real consumer surplus ( 0 = Θ ,  4 = H c  ) 
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Figure 17: Expected consumer surplus ( 5 . 0 = Θ ,  1 . 1 = H k  ) 
 
















Figure 18: Real consumer surplus ( 5 . 0 = Θ ,  1 . 1 = H k  ) 
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Figure 19: Expected consumer surplus ( 5 . 0 = Θ ,  4 = H c  ) 
 
 
















Figure 20: Real consumer surplus ( 5 . 0 = Θ ,  4 = H c  ) 
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Figure 21: Diversion percentage ( 1 . 1 = H k ,  4 = H c  ) 
 














Figure 22: Expected consumer surplus ( 1 . 1 = H k ,  4 = H c  ) 
 
















   58 
Figure 23: Real consumer surplus ( 1 . 1 = H k ,  4 = H c  ) 
 
















Figure 24: Profit ( 5 . 0 = Θ ,  1 . 1 = H k  ) 
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Figure 25: Profit ( 5 . 0 = Θ ,  4 = H c  ) 
 




















Figure 26: Profit ( 1 . 1 = H k ,  4 = H c  ) 
 
















   60 
APPENDIX I 
 
Equilibrium prices and quantities: 
 
1. Partial implementation of COOL 
a. With no costs of implementation            (27) 
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b. With costs of implementation            (36) 
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2. Total Implementation  
a. With no costs of implementation            (42) 
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( ) ( ) ( )
2
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ϖ
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CS
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=       (44) 
 
b. With costs of implementation            (48) 
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